Supermajority Voting in Constitutional Courts

"This book questions the wide use of the majority voting rule in many constitutional courts to declare statutes unconstitutional, and argues that constitutional courts should instead use supermajority voting rules when performing this task. Considering that constitutional courts often tackle hard moral issues, one may question whether a bare majority of judges should suffice to settle them, especially considering these courts' counter-majoritarian nature. Furthermore, wide use of majority rule to check the constitutionality of legislation may increasingly risk their reputation. Such a concern is developing in the United States following a series of US Supreme Court decisions. This book presents the case that majority rule is unjustified in constitutional adjudication. This means that, considering majority rule's traits, there are no decisive reasons for using this voting rule over other voting rules to declare statutes unconstitutional. The book goes on to argue that constitutional courts should replace majority rule with supermajority rules to assess the constitutionality of legislation. Thus, to declare statutes unconstitutional, it is argued that more than 50% of the judges present plus one judge present should be required. The book will be of interest to academics, researchers and policy-makers working in the areas of Constitutional Law and Politics"--